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Abstract 
Research on stereotypes demonstrates how existing prejudice affects the way we process 1 
outgroups. Recent studies have considered whether it is possible to change our implicit social bias 2 
by experimentally changing the relation between the self and outgroups. In a number of 3 
experimental studies, participants have been exposed to bodily illusions that induced ownership 4 
over a body different to their own with respect to  gender, age or race. Ownership of an outgroup 5 
body has been found to be associated with a significant reduction in implicit biases against that 6 
outgroup. We propose that these changes occur via a process of self-association that first takes place 7 
in the physical, bodily domain as an increase in perceived physical similarity between self and 8 
outgroup member. This self-association then extends to the conceptual domain, leading to a 9 
generalization of positive self-like associations to the outgroup.  10 
Keywords: body ownership, racial biases, implicit attitudes, social cognition, bodily illusions, 11 
immersive virtual reality 12 
 13 
Highlights 14 
 Multisensory correlations can induce illusory ownership of another person's body. 15 
 Ownership can thus be induced over a body of a different race, age, or gender. 16 
 Incorporating a body belonging to a social outgroup changes implicit social biases. 17 
 The multisensory experience of the body underpins higher-level social attitudes.  18 
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Body representations of self and other.  19 
Embodied accounts of social cognition suggest that the way in which we perceive others’ 20 
bodies in relation to our own plays a crucial role in sociocognitive processing [1-7]. The perception 21 
of bodily states in others can activate similar bodily states in the self, and this is taken as evidence 22 
that our representations of our own bodies and those of others can partially overlap. These shared 23 
body representations are thought to form the fundamental basis of empathy and our understanding 24 
of others’ emotions and actions. Interestingly, the activation of shared body representations is 25 
modulated by whether the person being observed is an ingroup or an outgroup member. For 26 
example, when we observe an individual of a different race to ourselves experiencing a specific 27 
bodily state, such as touch or pain, we show a reduced sharing of that bodily state. Furthermore, this 28 
reduction is modulated by our implicit social attitudes towards that racial group; the more 29 
negatively biased we are against members of that race, the less overlap between our representations 30 
of their bodies and our own [see below; 3-4,8].  31 
Until recently, research in this area has focused on how existing social bias and prejudice 32 
affect the way we process outgroup members [3-6], rather than investigating the potential 33 
malleability of our ingroup/outgroup classifications. A series of recent studies have successfully 34 
filled this gap [9-14] by asking whether and how it is possible to change implicit social attitudes 35 
towards outgroups [15] by experimentally increasing the sharing of  body representations [16]. 36 
Taken together, the findings show that changes in the mental representation of one’s own body 37 
affect the perceived similarity between one’s own body and that of an outgroup, resulting in 38 
significant changes in implicit biases. We here present a possible mechanism underlying these 39 
changes, which has far-reaching implications for our understanding of the development and 40 
malleability of social attitudes, and the crucial role of basic body representations in these processes. 41 
Racial Biases in Brain, Behaviour and the Body 42 
4 
 
A rapidly growing literature suggests that the body is central to our understanding of others. 43 
Neurocognitive studies into the ‘mirror neuron system’ have shown that we activate similar brain 44 
regions both when we observe a bodily state in others and when we experience that bodily state 45 
ourselves [17], reflecting an overlap between self and other bodily representations in the brain [18]. 46 
Evidence now suggests that this bodily resonance (see Glossary) can afford us a unique, first-person 47 
understanding of the experiences of others and is central to a number of social processes [7] 48 
including intention understanding [19], empathy [20], and emotion recognition [21]. Importantly, 49 
recent studies have revealed that social group categorisation, such as that based on racial group 50 
membership, can have a strong impact on the extent to which we resonate with others’ bodily states. 51 
Racial group membership is a salient distinguishing factor between individuals, and has long 52 
been known to strongly impact human social behaviours and attitudes. For example, we tend to 53 
show implicit biases towards members of our own race and against those of other races, even when 54 
we don’t hold any explicitly biased attitudes. These implicit racial biases can be measured 55 
behaviourally using an implicit association task (IAT: See Glossary [15]), but also can be seen at 56 
the neural level in the form of distinct patterns of brain activity [2]. Intriguingly, bodily resonance is 57 
modulated by whether the other person being observed is a member of a racial ingroup or outgroup 58 
[3-8]. For example, viewing a face being touched enhances the perception of touch on one’s own 59 
face, but this effect, known as the Visual Remapping of Touch, is not present when the observed 60 
face belongs to a racial outgroup member [5]. In the motor domain, participants show reduced 61 
vicarious activation of the motor cortex when observing actions performed by a racial outgroup 62 
member as compared to an ingroup member [4,8], and show decreased neural and motor responses 63 
when viewing racial outgroup members in pain [3,6]. Furthermore, this diminished neural 64 
resonance with the racial outgroup has been found to directly correlate with participants’ negative 65 
implicit racial biases [3].  66 
Until recently, research in this area has focussed on how bodily resonance is affected by 67 
existing racial attitudes. Could this relationship, in fact, be bidirectional? In other words, could 68 
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existing racial attitudes be modulated by the experimental manipulation of shared body 69 
representations? A series of recent studies has employed a range of multisensory methods to 70 
manipulate body ownership and has revealed striking effects on implicit racial attitudes. 71 
From body ownership to social cognition: Constraints and consequences  72 
Over the last twenty years, advances in experimental psychology, cognitive neuroscience 73 
and virtual reality have allowed scientists to experiment with a fundamental element of self-74 
awareness, the sense of body ownership (see Glossary), using a range of bodily illusions, such as 75 
the Rubber Hand Illusion [22], the Full Body Illusion [23-25] and the Enfacement Illusion [26] (see 76 
Box 1 for descriptions). These successful manipulations aptly demonstrated the malleability of the 77 
mental representation of one’s body and identity. 78 
Having established the behavioural and neural correlates of these multisensory-induced 79 
changes in body ownership, attention has turned towards the potential social constraints, as well as 80 
the social consequences, of such changes. Importantly, illusions of body ownership were revealed to 81 
be surprisingly impervious to social and perceptual distinctions. Several studies, using a variety of 82 
methods, successfully induced a sense of body ownership over bodies of different race- [9,10,12-83 
14,27, 28, 29], age- [11], size- [11,30,31,32] and gender-groups [25]. Furthermore, in the case 84 
where the different body depicted an outgroup person, the acquired ownership did not depend on 85 
pre-existing levels of implicit outgroup bias; participants experienced ownership over another’s 86 
body regardless of their levels of negative implicit attitudes towards the other’s social group [13]. 87 
This provides an interesting contrast with the findings already discussed, which show that shared 88 
body representations, in the absence of experimental manipulations that prime the self-relevance of 89 
the observed body, are indeed greatly influenced by factors such as racial attitudes. However, the 90 
manipulations used to induce bodily illusions involve highly salient multisensory cues which are 91 
strongly predictive of body ownership, and thus may override top-down modulations by social 92 
attitudes [9-13]. Conversely, in the absence of these powerful multisensory cues, the effects of 93 
social attitudes on bodily resonance with others may emerge. 94 
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Despite being relatively impervious to social factors, the experimental modulation of body 95 
ownership was found to have a number of intriguing effects on social cognition. After synchronous 96 
multisensory stimulation on the face (see Enfacement Illusion, Box 1), participants rated the other’s 97 
face as more attractive, more physically similar to their own, and they were also more likely to 98 
conform to the other’s opinions [33]. Effects were also seen in the emotional domain; the 99 
enfacement illusion improved recognition of the other’s emotions, with a specific increase in 100 
sensitivity to fearful facial expressions [34]. 101 
Changing your body changes your mind  102 
 Although changes in body ownership were found to affect social processing of ‘embodied’ 103 
individuals, the question of whether these changes could affect implicit biases against outgroups 104 
remained unanswered. In the first study to test this [9], participants’ implicit racial attitudes were 105 
measured before and after they experienced a rubber hand illusion with a hand of a different racial 106 
group (see Fig.1). To begin, light-skinned Caucasian participants completed a skin-color IAT to 107 
assess their implicit attitudes towards individuals with dark skin. In a separate session, synchronous 108 
multisensory stimulation was used to induce the feeling that a dark-skinned hand belonged to them, 109 
before their implicit attitudes were measured for a second time. As shown previously [13], 110 
participants experienced the other-race hand as their own and body ownership occurred regardless 111 
of their implicit attitudes towards that race. Importantly, participants showed a significant decrease 112 
in negative implicit attitudes towards dark skin, which correlated with the strength of ownership 113 
experienced over the other-race hand. The more intense the participants’ illusion of ownership over 114 
the dark-skinned rubber hand, the more positive their implicit racial attitudes became.  115 
 In a similar way, using an immersive virtual reality set-up [10], embodiment of light-116 
skinned people in a dark-skinned virtual body reduced their implicit racial bias as measured by a 117 
racial IAT. To control for the effects of mere perceptual difference between the body of the avatar 118 
and participants’ actual bodies, in another condition participants embodied a purple-skinned body, 119 
but this condition did not produce any changes in racial bias (see Fig.2) even though the subjective 120 
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illusion of body ownership was strong and not significantly different from embodiment of the light- 121 
or dark-skinned bodies. 122 
Importantly, such changes in body ownership to incorporate an outgroup body also increase 123 
‘bodily resonance’ with that outgroup. As previously discussed, our perceptual and neural 124 
resonance with others’ bodily experiences is significantly reduced when observing an outgroup 125 
member [3-6,8]. An example of this can be seen in the Visual Remapping of Touch effect, a 126 
phenomenon whereby our tactile sensitivity is enhanced when observing another person being 127 
touched. This effect, thought to be evidence of somatosensory resonance with others, is 128 
significantly reduced when the observed individual is a member of a racial or political outgroup [5]. 129 
In a recent study, an Enfacement Illusion was rapidly induced by exposing participants to two 130 
minutes of multisensory stimulation whilst viewing an out-group member’s face  [14]. Immediately 131 
afterwards, participants’ tactile sensitivity was measured whilst they observed the out-group 132 
member’s face being touched. Results showed that the experience of body ownership over the out-133 
group member’s face had increased the Visual Remapping of Touch effect up to the level normally 134 
associated with a same-race individual. 135 
A further study investigated implicit attitudes towards age [11] using an immersive virtual 136 
reality setup similar to that employed in previous studies [10].  Embodying an avatar representing a 137 
4-year-old child resulted in a bias towards associating the self with child-like compared to adult-like 138 
categorizations, as measured using an IAT. This study was notable because it demonstrated a role of 139 
the self-association in attitude change, whereas previous research [9,10] had investigated more 140 
generic positive or negative associations with the embodied social group. This can provide us with 141 
the beginnings of a mechanism to explain how exactly ‘changing your body’ is able to also ‘change 142 
your mind’. 143 
Illusions of self-resemblance may cause a generalisation of self-like associations to an 144 
outgroup  145 
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How can a change in the perception of a purely bodily aspect of the self ultimately alter not only 146 
associations with a higher-level concept of the self [11], but also generalize to the affective and 147 
social processing of others? We argue that these changes occur via a process of self-association, 148 
first in the physical, bodily domain as an increase in perceived physical similarity between self and 149 
outgroup member, and then in the conceptual domain, leading to a generalization of positive self-150 
like associations to the outgroup.  151 
The first relevant finding to support our argument is that experimentally induced modulations of 152 
body ownership enhance perceived physical similarity between self and other. For example, after 153 
the rubber hand illusion, participants rated the rubber hand as more physically similar to their own 154 
[26]. In a more objective quantification of a comparable effect, participants accepted morphed 155 
photos of faces with a higher percentage of the other as depicting themselves after experiencing an 156 
enfacement illusion, suggesting that the participants’ stored representations of their own faces were 157 
altered to incorporate aspects of the other person  [26,35,36].  158 
We suggest that this increased perceptual similarity between oneself and an outgroup member 159 
leads to a new association being formed between the self-concept and that outgroup. For this to 160 
occur, two processes are necessary. First, the perceptual self-similarity of the outgroup must 161 
activate the self-concept. We know that even subliminal exposure to images of one’s own body 162 
automatically activates positive self-associations [37,38] and thus we argue that perceptions of self-163 
similar bodies may activate self-associations in the same way. The second required step is for the 164 
positive evaluations associated with the self-concept to be generalized to the outgroup, by virtue of 165 
their perceptual similarity to the self. In support of this, the classical conditioning literature has long 166 
posited that associative learning of likes and dislikes are based on perceptual similarity, and that this 167 
can occur outside of awareness [39,40]. This process of evaluative conditioning has been shown to 168 
extend to social stimuli; individuals rapidly and unintentionally generalize affective processing to 169 
individuals who look physically similar [41,42].  170 
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We propose that, because of a newly established physical similarity between self and outgroup, 171 
the conceptual representations of self and outgroup also become linked. Via a process of evaluative 172 
generalization, the positive evaluations associated with the self-concept now extend to the 173 
embodied outgroup. This results in the outgroup not only being associated with the self-concept, as 174 
already shown by [11], but also with positive concepts more generally, as shown by [9,10]. This 175 
mechanism can be thought of as maintaining consistency between the multifaceted aspects of self 176 
(personality, attitudes and behaviors) and the body representation following the updates of the sense 177 
of body ownership (see Box 2).  178 
The mechanism proposed here appeals to basic, well-established processes from the associative 179 
learning literature to provide a clear and plausible explanation of current findings. The novel step 180 
we have taken is to pair an associative account with what we know about the perceived physical 181 
similarity elicited by bodily illusions. By appealing to a multidimensional self-representation, in 182 
which both bodily and conceptual aspects of the self are bound in a coherent, supramodal construct, 183 
we can bridge the gap between the perceptual, bodily representations involved in body ownership, 184 
and the evaluative, conceptual representations involved in implicit social attitudes. The resulting 185 
mechanism provides us with a coherent account of how changes in body ownership can close this 186 
gap in order to affect higher-level social processes. 187 
Concluding Remarks 188 
Overall, an intriguing and consistent pattern of results has emerged from independent research 189 
groups, whereby changes in the experience of ownership over an outgroup body of different race 190 
results in significant reductions of the levels of implicit bias against that outgroup . Furthermore, 191 
similar changes are elicited in measures of somatosensory remapping [14] that reflect levels of body 192 
resonance between people. Taken together, these findings suggest that changes in the perceived 193 
similarity between self and others, caused by shared multisensory experiences, might ‘bridge the 194 
gap’ between the basic, perceptual representation of bodies, and the complex social mechanisms 195 
underlying much of our everyday social interaction.  196 
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A key challenge for future work is to elucidate the neural mechanisms involved in these 197 
changes. The networks involved in implicit racial bias are already known [2], and appear to serve 198 
two related yet distinct functions. The first function, likely to be subserved by the amygdala, 199 
generates a rapid, automatic affective reaction to other-race stimuli, and the second, subserved by 200 
the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and anterior cingulate cortex, controls and regulates the expression 201 
of this affective reaction according to explicitly desired behaviours. Thus, an investigation of the 202 
neural mechanisms of our findings will allow us to clearly elucidate exactly which process is being 203 
altered; do the changes in body ownership alter the initial affective processing of the racial 204 
outgroup, or instead alter the way this affective reaction is detected, controlled and expressed? 205 
A neural investigation of the effects of ‘changing race’ will also reveal important information 206 
regarding its effects on bodily resonance. Initial behavioural evidence has suggested that induced 207 
changes in body ownership can increase somatosensory resonance when observing a different-race 208 
individual being touched [14]. An important next step would be to investigate if this increased 209 
resonance extends to other domains, e.g., the motor domain, where it could have important 210 
consequences for key social processes [7]. We propose that changes in perceived interpersonal 211 
similarity play a causal role in this mechanism, and it is now timely to elucidate how exactly this 212 
interpersonal bodily similarity may modulate activity in the ‘mirror system’.  213 
These recent findings also lead us to new insights into how implicit social biases are formed and 214 
maintained. Previously, implicit racial biases have been considered relatively difficult to change 215 
[43]. Earlier attempts to alter these racial biases have tended to involve lengthy training 216 
programmes and conscious interventions [e.g. 44]. In contrast, the research we have reviewed here 217 
has revealed an exciting new mechanism by which implicit social biases can be modulated ‘from 218 
the body upwards’. We propose a potential cognitive underpinning of these changes, from body 219 
ownership to social cognition, which appeals to associative learning and predictive coding to 220 
provide us not only with a rich theoretical framework in which the current data can be understood, 221 
but also with a set of open questions to test in future research (see Box 3).  222 
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Glossary 372 
Bodily resonance: The process by which the perception of bodily states in others can activate 373 
similar bodily states in the self [5,17,18]. This process is thought to be central to a number of 374 
fundamental social processes including empathy, action understanding and emotion recognition. 375 
This can be measured at the neural level, for example by recording activity in the premotor cortex 376 
when observing other-performed actions [17], or behaviourally, for example by measuring the 377 
increase in a participant’s tactile sensitivity caused by observing another being touched [5].  378 
Body ownership: Body ownership refers to the special perceptual status of one’s own body, 379 
which makes bodily sensations seem unique to oneself, that is, the feeling that ‘‘my body’’ belongs 380 
to me, and is ever present in my mental life [16,45]. 381 
Implicit association task (IAT): The IAT is a computerised task which involves a rapid 382 
categorisation of verbal stimuli, pictorial stimuli, or both. Analysis of the patterns of response times 383 
and errors provides a metric of implicit associations between categories. Commonly, the 384 
associations measured are between a social category, e.g., a specific racial group, and positive 385 
versus negative associations, to provide a measure of bias in implicit evaluative attitudes. Implicit 386 
biases measured using this method have been found to be internally consistent, reliable and 387 
predictive of explicit behaviours [15]. 388 
Self –concept: A multidimensional construct, comprising a collection of knowledge structures 389 
regarding one’s attitudes, dispositions, skills and abilities, which are temporally stable and trans-390 
situational [46].   391 
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Box 1: Manipulations of Body Ownership  392 
Rubber Hand Illusion (RHI) 393 
Watching a rubber hand being stroked synchronously with one’s own unseen hand causes 394 
the rubber hand to be attributed to one’s own body, to “feel like it’s my hand” [22]. This 395 
synchronous stimulation not only elicits a subjective experience of ownership over the hand, but 396 
also causes the perceived location of one’s own hand to drift towards the rubber hand [47] and a 397 
stress-evoked skin conductance response to be elicited when the rubber hand is threatened [48]. The 398 
illusion of ownership over the rubber hand does not occur when the rubber hand is stroked 399 
asynchronously with respect to the subject’s own hand, and thus experiments investigating body 400 
ownership commonly use asynchronous stimulation as a control condition. An illusion of the same 401 
intensity can be also developed over a virtual hand by either synchronous visuotactile [49] or 402 
visuomotor [50] correlations. This illusion persists through radical transformations such as 403 
extensive elongation of the arm [51] or change in the virtual hand position [52] with respect to the 404 
real one.  405 
Enfacement Illusion 406 
The enfacement illusion is a facial analogue of the rubber hand illusion. Participants watch a 407 
video showing the face of an unfamiliar other being stroked with a cotton bud on the cheek, while 408 
the participant receives identical stroking on their own, congruent cheek in synchrony with the 409 
touch they see. As in the RHI, synchronous, but not asynchronous, visuotactile stimulation elicits 410 
illusory feelings of ownership over the other’s face [53]. Enfacement also influences social 411 
cognition [33,34] and produces a measurable bias in self-face recognition, whereby participants 412 
perceive the other’s face as looking more like their own [26,35,36].  413 
Full-body illusions 414 
Illusory ownership over a physical manikin body that substituted the participant’s real body 415 
was demonstrated in [23]. Live video, from cameras attached to the manikin, was streamed to head-416 
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mounted displays on the participants, so that when looking down they would see the manikin body 417 
visually substituting their own. Synchronous tapping on the manikin body and the real body led to 418 
illusory body ownership, in a similar way to the more traditional rubber hand and enfacement 419 
illusions. More advanced systems have now been developed, using Immersive Virtual Reality (IVR) 420 
[25]. Participants wear a head-tracked stereo head-mounted display which provides computer 421 
generated images immersing the participant in a virtual world. The participant’s own body is 422 
substituted by a virtual body, viewed from a first-person perspective, with a motion capture system 423 
so that their virtual body moves with their real body movements. This set up results in sensorimotor 424 
correlations (visual, proprioceptive, tactile and motor) that elicit illusions of ownership and agency 425 
over the virtual body [10,11,54].  426 
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Figure 1. Inducing ownership over a body of another race 427 
A. The Rubber Hand Illusion: Light-skinned Caucasian participants observe a dark-skinned rubber 428 
hand being stimulated in synchrony with their own unseen hand. This elicits a shift of body 429 
ownership to incorporate the other-race limb [adapted from 9]. 430 
B. The Enfacement Illusion: Participants viewed the face of a racial outgroup member being 431 
stimulated in synchrony with their own to induce a sense of ownership over the observed face [see 432 
14]. 433 
C. Immersive Virtual Reality: (i) A participant wears a wide field-of-view stereo head-tracked head-434 
mounted display and a motion capture suit for real time body tracking. (ii) This is the participant’s 435 
view of the situation, whereby she can see her virtual body both directly and reflected in the mirror, 436 
in stereo as shown. The body she sees could be dark-skinned, light-skinned or purple; in this case, 437 
the virtual body is dark-skinned whereas she is light-skinned [adapted from 10]. 438 
439 
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Figure 2: Changes in implicit racial attitudes after incorporating an other-race body in an 440 
Immersive Virtual Reality setup 441 
 Light-skinned Caucasian participants took part in a between-groups experiment where they 442 
occupied a White (A) or Black (B) body in a virtual environment. They could see their body from a 443 
first-person perspective when they looked down, as well as in a virtual mirror (see Figure 1, Panel 444 
C(ii)). Two control groups were also included – in these conditions, participants either had no 445 
virtual body (C), or the body was of an unnatural purple colour (D) to control for general 446 
dissimilarity to their own skin. Participants’ implicit racial biases were measured before and after 447 
embodiment. Participants who embodied a Black avatar showed a decrease in their implicit biases 448 
against Black individuals, which was significantly greater than for those who embodied a White 449 
avatar. Adapted from [10]. 450 
451 
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Box 2: Predictive coding models of the Self 452 
How we recognise ourselves, and what governs our sense of ownership over our bodies, is 453 
still under much debate in the psychological and neuroscientific literature. However, a recent 454 
interest in Predictive Coding as a unifying theory of brain function has provided a plausible 455 
framework for understanding the cognitive basis of self-recognition [55]. On this account, one’s 456 
body is processed in a probabilistic manner as the most likely to be “me”, given prior knowledge 457 
about our bodies and incoming sensory information. Such probabilistic representation arises 458 
through the integration of information from hierarchically organised unimodal systems in higher-459 
level multimodal areas. In the case of bodily illusions, viewing touch on a different  body evokes a 460 
sensation of touch on one’s own body, and this generates bottom-up error signals from unimodal 461 
sensory systems. Perceptual learning processes will update the body representation to first induce a 462 
sense of ownership over the new body and next to incorporate perceptual features of the other’s 463 
body, in order to minimise this error and maintain a continual sense of ‘mineness’. Therefore, this 464 
account can explain how synchronous multisensory stimulation, such as that provided during the 465 
Rubber Hand and other bodily illusions, can not only elicit fundamental shifts in body ownership, 466 
but can also elicit a subsequent increase in perceived similarity between the bodies of self and other.  467 
 Importantly, the self is not represented solely at a basic, perceptual level. The self is a 468 
multimodal, hierarchical construct containing both low-level, bodily representations as well as 469 
higher level attitudes and beliefs. On a predictive coding account,  these different levels of 470 
representation continuously interact [55,56], as prediction errors, when left unexplained at one level 471 
,need to be processed and eliminated at a higher level of the hierarchy. An explanatory strength of 472 
the predictive coding approach is that it can be applied to the whole information processing 473 
hierarchy [e.g. 57], as it argues for complimentary hierarchical top-down and bottom-up processes. 474 
A change in low-level, perceptual representations of one’s own body in relation to the body of an 475 
outgroup member creates errors further up in the processing hierarchy, as this new information now 476 
conflicts with more abstract, higher-order representations of oneself and the outgroup. These errors 477 
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must then be minimised in a similar way, by updating attitudes and beliefs held about oneself and 478 
the outgroup. In this way, the consistency within the multimodal self-representation is maintained. 479 
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Box 3: Outstanding Questions 480 
• What is the time course of these effects? Are they persistent over time? 481 
• What are the underlying neural mechanisms? 482 
• Do these changes in implicit associations have behavioural consequences in daily life? 483 
• Can similar effects be found with social groups that are not defined by perceptual 484 
differences, such as political or religious groups, merely by informing the participant of the 485 
embodied individual’s group membership? 486 
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